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Abstract
We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation σ) in
the Minority Game (MG) can decrease below the random coin-toss limit if
the agents use more general, stochastic strategies. This suppression of σ
results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents
act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents
act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.
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The Minority Game (MG) of Challet and Zhang [1–3] offers a simple paradigm for
complex, adaptive systems. The MG comprises an odd number N of agents, each with
s strategies and a memory size m, who repeatedly compete to be in the minority. In the
basic MG, where agents always use their highest scoring strategy, the size of the fluctuations
(i.e. standard deviation σ) falls below the random, coin-toss limit for largem [3]. Cavagna et
al [4] considered an interesting modification of the basic MG, the ‘Thermal Minority Game’
(TMG), whereby agents choose between their strategies using an exponential probability
weighting. As pointed out by Marsili et al [5], such a probabilistic strategy weighting has
a long tradition in economics and encodes a particular behavioral model. The numerical
simulations of Cavagna et al demonstrated that at small m, where the MG σ is larger-than-
random, the TMG σ could be pushed below the random coin-toss limit just by altering this
relative probability weighting, or equivalently the ‘temperature’ T [4]. This reduction in
σ for stochastic strategies seems fairly general: for example, we had reported earlier on a
modified MG in which agents with stochastic strategies also generate a smaller-than-random
σ for small m [6].
In this paper, we provide a quantitative theory which explains how the standard deviation
σ in the MG can get reduced from larger-than-random to smaller-than-random if more
general, stochastic strategies are used. In particular, we show that stochastic strategy rules
tend to increase the cancellation between the actions of a crowd of like-minded agents [7,8]
and its anti-correlated partner (anticrowd), thereby reducing σ below the random coin-toss
limit.
The MG [1] comprises an odd number of agents N who choose repeatedly between option
0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers
win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning
decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes is made available to
the agents at each timestep [9]. The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of
the game, with repetitions allowed, from the pool of all possible strategies. After each turn,
the agent assigns one (virtual) point to each of his strategies which would have predicted
the correct outcome. In the basic MG, each agent uses the most successful strategy in his
possession, i.e. the one with the most virtual points. Because of crowd effects [8], σ is
larger-than-random for small m. Our task is to explain quantitatively why the larger-than-
random σ in this ‘crowded’ regime (i.e. small m) becomes smaller-than-random when the
strategy-picking rule is made stochastic, such as in Ref. [4].
Consider any two strategies r and r∗ within the list of 2m+1 strategies in the reduced
strategy space [1,8]. At any moment in the game, the strategies can be ranked according to
their virtual points, r = 1, 2 . . . 2m+1 where r = 1 is the best strategy, r = 2 is second best,
etc. In the small m regime of interest, the virtual-point strategy ranking and popularity
ranking for strategies are similar [8]. Consider s = 2 as in Ref. [4]. Let p(r, r∗|r∗ ≥ r) be
the probability that a given agent picks r and r∗, where r∗ ≥ r (i.e. r is the best, or equal
best, among his s = 2 strategies). In contrast, let p(r, r∗|r∗ ≤ r) be the probability that a
given agent picks r and r∗, where r∗ ≤ r (i.e. r is the worst, or equal worst, among his s = 2
strategies). Let θ be the probability that the agent uses the worst of his s = 2 strategies,
while 1 − θ is the probability that he uses the best. The probability that the agent plays r
is given by
pr =
2m+1∑
r∗=1
[ θ p(r, r∗|r∗ ≤ r) + (1− θ) p(r, r∗|r∗ ≥ r)]
= (1− θ) p+(r) + θ p−(r) + 2−2(m+1) θ (1)
where p+(r) is the probability that the agent has picked r and that r is the agent’s best (or
equal best) strategy; p−(r) is the probability that the agent has picked r and that r is the
agent’s worst strategy. It is straightforward to show that
2
p+(r) =
([
1− (r − 1)
2m+1
]2
−
[
1− r
2m+1
]2)
. (2)
Note that p+(r) + p−(r) = p(r) where
p(r) = 2−m(1− 2−(m+2)) (3)
is the probability that the agent holds strategy r after his s = 2 picks, with no condition
on whether it is best or worst. An expression for p−(r) follows from Eqs. (2) and (3). The
basic MG [1] corresponds to the case θ = 0.
In the TMG, each agent is equipped at each timestep with his own (biased) coin char-
acterised by exponential probability weightings [4]. An agent then flips this coin at each
timestep to decide which strategy to use [4]. To relate the present analysis to the TMG in
Ref. [4], we consider 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2: θ = 0 corresponds to ‘temperature’ T = 0 while θ → 1/2
corresponds to T → ∞ [10] with θ = 1/2[1 − tanh(1/T )]. Consider the mean number of
agents playing strategy r which is given by
nr = Npr = N (1− 2θ) p+(r) +N θ p(r) + 2−2(m+1) N θ . (4)
If nr agents use the same strategy r, then they will act as a ‘crowd’, i.e. they will make
the same decision. If nr¯ agents simultaneously use the strategy r¯ anticorrelated to r, they
will make the opposite (anticorrelated) decision and will hence act as an ‘anticrowd’ [8].
Averaging over the stochastics of the strategy-use which is introduced by allowing each
agent to flip a (biased) coin at each timestep, the standard deviation σθ in the number of
agents making a particular decision (say 0) becomes
σ =
[
1
2
2m+1∑
r=1
2m+1∑
r′=1
1
4
|nr − nr′|2P (r′ = r¯)
] 1
2
(5)
where P (r′ = r¯) is the probability that any strategy r′ is the anti-correlated partner of
strategy r in the list of strategies when ordered in terms of popularity {nr} [8]. The quantities
nr and nr′ are θ-dependent (see Eq. (4)). Substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) for r and r
′ into
Eq. (5) yields
σθ = |1− 2θ| σθ=0 (6)
where σθ=0 is the standard deviation when θ = 0, i.e. the basic MG. Equation (6) explicitly
shows that the standard deviation σθ decreases as θ increases (recall 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1/2): in other
words, the standard deviation decreases as agents use their worst strategy with increasing
probability. An increase in θ leads to a reduction in the size of the larger crowds using
high-scoring strategies, as well as an increase in the size of the smaller anticrowds using
lower-scoring strategies, hence resulting in a more substantial cancellation effect between
the crowd and the anticrowd. As θ increases, σθ will eventually drop below the random
coin-toss result at θ = θc where
θc =
1
2
−
√
N
4
1
σθ=0
. (7)
Elsewhere we presented a quantitative formulation for σθ=0. In particular, Ref. [8] showed
that P (r′ = r¯) at small m lay between that of a δ-function distribution δr′,2m+1+1−r peaked
at r′ = 2m+1 + 1 − r, and a flat distribution [2(m+1) − 1]−1 (N.B. P (r′ = r¯) = 0 at r′ = r)
[8]. Using these distributions, the resulting expressions for σθ are
3
σdelta = (1− 2θ) N√
3
2−(
m
2
+1)
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
(8)
and
σflat = (1− 2θ) N
2
√
3
[2(m+1) − 1]− 12
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
(9)
respectively. For the TMG, θ = (1/2)[1−tanh(1/T )] although we emphasize that the present
theory is not limited to the case of ‘thermal’ strategy weightings.
Figure 1 shows a comparison between the theory of Eqs. (8) and (9) and numerical
simulation for various runs. The theory agrees well in the range θ = 0 → 0.35 and, most
importantly, provides a quantitative explanation for the transition in σ from larger-than-
random to smaller-than-random as θ (and hence T ) is increased. The numerical data for
different runs has a significant natural spread: remarkably most of these data points lie in
the region of these two analytic curves.
Above θ = 0.35, the numerical data tend to flatten off while the present theory predicts
a decrease in σ as θ → 0.5. This is because the present theory averages out the fluctuations
in strategy-use at each time-step (Eq. (4) only considers the mean number of agents using
strategy r). Consider θ = 0.5. For a particular configuration of strategies picked at the start
of the game, and at a particular moment in time, the number of agents using each strategy is
typically distributed around the mean value nr = N2
−(m+1) given by Eq. (4) for θ = 0.5. The
resulting distribution describing the strategy-use is therefore non-flat. It is these fluctuations
about the mean nr and nr¯ which give rise to a non-zero σ. Our present crowd-anticrowd
theory can be extended to account for the effect of these fluctuations in strategy-use for
θ → 0.5 in the following way: All N agents are randomly assigned 2 strategies. To represent
a turn in the game, each agent flips a (fair) coin to decide which of the two strategies is the
preferred one. Having generated a list of the number of agents using each strategy, σ is then
found in the usual way by cancelling off crowds and anticrowds. A time-averaged value for
σ is then obtained by averaging over 100 independent coin-flip outcomes for the given initial
distribution of strategies among agents. This procedure provides a semi-analytic calculation
for the value of σ at θ = 0.5. Inset (a) in Fig. 1 shows the measured numerical distribution
in σ for θ = 0.5, while inset (b) shows the result from the semi-analytic procedure. The two
distributions are in good agreement. It is also possible to perform a fully analytic calculation
of the average σθ in the θ → 0.5 limit: the initial random assignment of strategies can be
modelled using a random-walk. This yields an average value of |nr−nr¯|2 (i.e. time-averaged
over the fluctuations) given by N2−m(1 − 2−(m+1)). Summing over all pairs of correlated-
anticorrelated strategies, i.e. all crowd-anticrowd pairs, yields a (configuration-average)
standard deviation given by
σθ→0.5 =
√
N
2
[1− 2−(m+1)] 12 . (10)
For N = 101 as shown in Fig. 1, the analytic theory (Eq. (10)) and semi-analytic theory
both give an average standard deviation σθ→0.5 = 4.7, while the numerical simulation yields
4.5. The agreement is good. We note that all these values lie below the random coin-toss
limit
√
N/2 = 5.0: hence the theoretical and numerical results are not equal to the random
coin-toss limit as θ → 0.5 (i.e. T → ∞). We have also checked this for N = 11: here
the analytic value is 1.55, the semi-analytic value is 1.56 and the numerical value is 1.55,
however the random coin-toss limit is 1.66. We note that the numerical results obtained
using the full and reduced strategy spaces are very similar; hence our results and conclusions
are indeed general. Finally, we would like to point out that the high-T regime has been the
subject of much debate recently. In particular, Challet et al identified problems [11–13] with
the T →∞ results of Ref. [4]. We refer to Refs. [11–13] for a detailed discussion.
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Given the complexity of these many-agent games, it is remarkable that our simple ana-
lytic approach invoking crowd effects can quantitatively explain the main feature whereby
σ falls below the random, coin-toss limit as θ (or T [4]) increases. This feature, which is
arguably the most striking result of the TMG, can therefore be explained without having to
solve the full game dynamics. This result also strengthens our belief that many properties
of the MG can be understood using simple notions of crowd-anticrowd interplay.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Comparison between numerical simulations (circles) and the present analytic
theory for the standard deviation σ as a function of the probability θ. Analytic theory (solid
line): σdelta using Eq. (8), σflat using Eq. (9). N = 101, m = 2 and s = 2. Dashed line shows
random coin-toss value. Solid arrow indicates theoretical value σθ→0.5 = 4.7 for θ → 0.5 (see
text). Inset shows distribution of σ values at θ = 0.5 for several thousand randomly-chosen
initial strategy configurations: (a) numerical simulation, (b) semi-analytic theory (see text).
Quantities shown are dimensionless.
7
26
10
14
18
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
θ
σ σdelta
σflat σθ   0.5 
0 5
b
0 5
a
